

## **Civilian or Military Power Europe? The Evolving Nature of European Union Power**



**Scott Nicholas Romaniuk,**

*School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin*

[scott.n.romaniuk@gmail.com](mailto:scott.n.romaniuk@gmail.com)

### **Abstract**

The collapse of Soviet power in Eastern Europe surfaced expectations of a wave of civilian power in international relations (IR). The European Community was expected to shift from exercising military power in a defensive manner, and move inextricably toward non-military and economic means in order to achieve national objectives. The development of supranational structures and institutions within Europe, to manage international issues, was also expected to represent part of the core of Europe's burgeoning role in IR. Although such trends have become manifest in the conduct of the European Union (EU), the Union's most recent role in Kosovo—a mission that was undertaken beyond the management of the United Nations (UN)—represents a considerable sway from civilian power Europe. While the Union's operations in the recent past has demonstrated the value in a dual soft hard power orientation, the EU's posture of sitting astride both civilian and military roles presents potentially negative consequences for the 'ethicacy' and efficacy of its non-military external policies. Utilizing the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK) as means of analyses, this article presents the argument that the EU has moved beyond its role as a civilian power but has not abandoned its civilian commitments or image.

**Key words:** European Union; external policies; Military Power; Normative Power; international relations (IR); Kosovo; peace-building; security; state-building

---

<sup>1</sup> Scott Nicholas Romaniuk is a doctoral candidate in Politics and International Relations

## I. Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about strident change in nearly every facet of European society, and changed many traditional points of view and approaches in the field of international relations (IR). The development of supranational structures and institutions within Europe was also expected to represent part of the core of Europe's emerging civilian conduct in regional and global affairs. As new and dynamic methods of arrangement and displays of causation developed in Europe's geo-political arena, many scholars and policy-makers expected less emphasis to be placed on military power in the 'New World Order,' and greater attention on civilian influence. The expectations of many were fulfilled as the EU's practice had gone *a posse ad esse*. Alastair Buchan argued that military power, the application of direct military force, was less attractive an option in addressing international concerns, employing "Change Without War" as his watchword.<sup>2</sup> However, "the impact of the end of the Cold War on the European Community was not to reinforce its civilian power image," and rather than consolidating a new civilian behaviour, the new European Union (EU) established by the Maastricht Treaty set about acquiring a "defence dimension."<sup>3</sup>

The EU's regional exercise of power points to the need for a reinforcement of the Union's movement beyond normative power to military and security 'actorness.' For the first time in its history, the EU played a unique and central role not only in state-building but in state-creation. The EU's Kosovo operations represented a truly distinctive European model of social protection and political objectivity. With the EU having presented itself as a midwife in self-determination and state- sovereignty, Kosovo's formation echoes the pre-existing debate of the EU's role in IR as something beyond a civilian power.

---

<sup>2</sup> See, Alastair Buchan, *Change Without War: The Shifting Structures of World Power*. (London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 1975).

<sup>3</sup> Karen E. Smith, "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April-June 2000), 11.

Utilizing the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK) as means of analyses, this article presents the argument that the EU has moved beyond its role as a civilian power, though it has not abandoned its civilian commitments or image. Although the EU's conceived standard of other regional and international actors is advanced by soft and hard power, there are obvious pitfalls to this direct approach, and will be explored in the following pages. This article will also demonstrate that even though the EU's posture of sitting astride both civilian and military power presents potentially negative consequences for the 'ethicacy' and efficacy of its non-military internal and external policies, the Union must adopt the utility of both civilian and military power to be an effective regional and global actor.

The first section navigates part of the debate about the EU as a civilian power, and presents some critical questions about its role. The second and third sections show the nature of EU power in South Eastern Europe while also illustrating the approach that its institutions and authorities have taken to build peace and stability in Kosovo. The fourth section shows how the EU has moved beyond the role of civilian power, and in into a new order of supranational 'actorness' along military lines. It presents a framework for addressing the type of questions presented in the first section. To this end, it is hoped that a notional contribution will be made to the ongoing dialogue of Europe's widening and ever-evolving role in IR. The legitimacy of the EU, when it engages in military intervention and peace-keeping or peace-building is likely to come under increased criticism by both Union citizens as well as those who are the subject of intervention, if external engagements are not undertaken in a purely civilian manner.

## **II. What Kind of 'Power' is the EU?**

The debate about the nature of EU power in IR has, in academic circles, persisted beyond a period of three decades. Francois Duchêne, in his 1972 chapter entitled "Europe's Role in World Peace", was the first to speak of the European Community (EC) as a "civilian

power”.<sup>4</sup> The source of Europe’s normative influence, according to Duchêne, rests in the ability to expand the model of guaranteeing stability and security through the application of economic and political force but *not* through military means. Europe’s nascent economic and political resources were measured as the fundamental bases for an appropriate policy instrument in Europe’s internal and external affairs. Various elements, including, trade, co-operation or association agreements, aid, monetary assistance, institutionalized dialogue, and the promise of EU membership for European states, were brought together in a unified fashion to produce a civilian power EU.

With the civilian nature of the EU framed these elements, Europe must rely solely on its practice *through* such elements in order to lend credibility and sustainability to its own good governance. Given the fact that by definition, civilian power Europe was a civilian power, lacking military means, “(even as a residual instrument), it relied on economic and diplomatic instruments to influence other actors.”<sup>5</sup> However, two points should be noted: (i) when the EU develops and applies a military capability and force in its foreign policy, it steps beyond its civilian power limitations; (ii) even though, as Manners suggests, “good (stated) intentions do not always translate into good practice,”<sup>6</sup> practice fundamentally serves as the most clear and unambiguous identity signature of any institution or organization. A pervasion of practice in a manner that accords with these two points means suggests the EU’s position of exerting normative influence on other states is inextricably altered. In considering the application of force by civilian power Europe, Ian Manners asserts, “that militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power”, but “it is increasingly *risking* [emphasis my own] its normative power”.<sup>7</sup> Resultantly, a distinguishable and perplexing ambiguity regarding Europe’s external policy character is thus raised.

---

4 See, Francois Duchêne, “Europe's Role in World Peace,” in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. (London, UK: Collins), 32-47.

5 Karen E. Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”, *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April-June 2000), 13.

6 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2002), 241.

7 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Cross-Roads”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006), 183 and 194.

At the beginning of the 1980s, in conditions of slowing integration, namely during a state of so-called “euro-sclerosis” but also during a period of reduced tension in East-West relations, Hedley Bull criticized Duchêne’s conceptions of Europe’s normative power. The normative power concept is, according to Bull, “a contradiction in terms” given that the power and influence exerted by the EU and other civilian actors is conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they did not control.<sup>8</sup> As a retort, Bull advocated the development of European military capabilities. The question of whether European foreign policy exists at all has been left behind by the development of common foreign and security policies, but it is critical to note that what so distinguishes European foreign policy should be seen as the essential element(s) that distinguish Europe.

Since civilian power Europe alters, or is at least expected or seen to alter, the identity of other state-actors by providing an attractive, but not necessarily a *de novo* model of good governance and peaceful relations, the use of force contradicts the essence of the EU’s normative policies. Therefore, what emerges from such discourse is a question of whether the EU should be viewed as a military power that exercises normative influence, or should it be seen as a normative power that applies military power? Even though the EU has exemplified the application of power in terms other than the use of military force, a general propensity exists to view the Union as a civilian power. Still, some scholars have reproached such a claim on the basis that the EU more accurately rests along a spectrum between two ideal types of civilian and military powers.<sup>9</sup> With developments that have taken place in the IR field during the 1990s, the EU has rushed headlong into a new approach to foreign policy that transcends traditional claims.

---

8 Hedley Bull quoted in Adrian Hyde-Price, “Normative Power Europe: a realist critique”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006), 218.

9 Karen Smith, “*Still Civilian Power EU?*” European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2005, 16 and 17.

The characterization of the EU, as presented by Manners, represents its own contradiction when one considers how and by whom the EU's identity is applied. In the first place, Manners' normative power Europe is seen not through the various institutions involved in exerting each particular case of power, but through the international identity that the EU has developed as a whole, based on common values and ideologies that have been promoted as representing the Union in the *past*. In the second place, The EU is capable of changing the concept of what is 'normal' or 'civil' in international politics "[s]imply by existing as different in a world of states and relations between them."<sup>10</sup>

In understanding that states' positive intentions do not always translate into positive practice, Manners reasons, "the EU is normatively different to other polities with its commitment to individual rights and principles".<sup>11</sup> To illustrate this point, we might imagine, "the ideational impact of the EU's international identity and role as representing normative power."<sup>12</sup> The EU we speak of when interpreting its use of civilian power is not referencing a specific actor or institution, but rather the conceptual and ideational identity that it possesses on a regional and on an international level. Therefore, we may assume that from the perspective of the institutions operating under EU governance, civilian and normative influence is taking place, yet military force is an equally valid perception from an external perspective. This point of view is not *only* limited to external audiences, however, as many member-states of the EU have contested the essential nature of European intervention in Kosovo and elsewhere on both regional and global scales.

The EU has been eminently successful in past operations in South Eastern Europe, for example, after which Europe was still consensually viewed as a force for peace, even though peaceful ends were achieved through violent means. The secessionist conflicts of the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s provide a case in point that diplomatic efforts and economic pressure came to represent only a moderate estimation

---

10 Ian Manners. "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, (2008), 65.

11 Ian Manners. "Normative Power Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2002), 241.

12 *Ibid.*, 238.

of worth, and to some, was seen as a summons back to the values of military force.<sup>13</sup> While the success of operations was a true demonstration of the reality of power, operational progress and officials' satisfactions concurrently developed a momentous precedent.

The argument has been presented that soft power in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans, during the conflicts, “were of little value without the credible backing of military” force and power;

In Kosovo, we learned the same lesson once again: our military competence was essential in preventing a humanitarian tragedy. Today, in Afghanistan, military capabilities are once again demonstrating their importance. . . . These dramatic changes were not brought about by ‘soft power’ or moral appeals. They were brought about by military force—applied in a determined and bold fashion, and embedded in what amounts to a political masterstroke, that effective military means will remain a precondition for our security. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan once memorably put it: You can do a lot with diplomacy, but much more with diplomacy backed by effective military force.<sup>14</sup>

Increasingly, the EU is demonstrating its readiness to move beyond traditional, soft power foreign policy methods, including norm diffusion, to an geo-political arena that includes the readiness to employ hard power, such as military coercion and the deployment of effective and technologically advanced military force capabilities. In other words, the past success serves as an indicant of external governance potential.

Seemingly, the EU recognizes the value in utilizing military power as a means of realizing its political, social, and economic objectives, the actualization of which has otherwise been sought through civilian means. Military action in Kosovo is a clear

---

<sup>13</sup> See, Carl Bildt, “Force and Diplomacy”, *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2000): 141-148.

<sup>14</sup> Lord Robertson, quoted in Adrian Hyde-Pierce, “European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force,” in Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 146.

prognosis that the Union is willing to defend the norms that it attempts to spread regionally. Greater still, however, is the message that the coupling of military power and normative influence produces a balance-positive result that works in favour of international peace and security, not to mention the ultimately achievement of European political, economic, and social objectives.

The historical narrative of European peace operations drives the idea that the conduct of the Union is likely to remain subject to contradiction and negative repose. To be sure, the EU's recent endeavours have proven the liquidity of its external policy boundaries, as well as its propensity to move from the normative side of the ledger to the military side upon its own choosing. This is especially the case in the context of peace and security operations.

An oscillation of this nature represents the very crux of the debate on which the EU's actions rest. One interesting point of supposition that lies beyond the scope of this article, is the question of, whether the EU has sought to employ an increasingly military tone in its external policy when it is certain to achieve its desired results? In other words, does the EU choose to apply military force only to targets considered weaker than itself?

We are now bearing witness, more so than ever, to new and dynamic perspectives on the nature of European foreign policy, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Currently facing scholars and practitioners alike are such questions as: What *kind* of power is the EU? How should the EU best represent its power in internal and external models? How might regional and global audiences perceive *and* respond to the Union's articulation of military power? Will the EU be forced to choose either a definitively civilian or military status at any point in the future or should it opt to fill both roles? While there do not appear to be any easy answers at our disposal, the nuanced conceptualization of the nature of EU foreign and security policy, in an ever-evolving domain of IR should be seen as a positive step in understanding one aspect of a troubled Union in an otherwise troubled Europe.

### **III. Towards an EU Solution for Kosovo**

In the beginning of April 2007, the United Nations Special Envoy for Kosovo, former Finnish president Ahtisaari, presented his proposal for the solution of Kosovo's future status to the UN Security Council. The proposal recommended an internationally (EU and NATO) supervised independence of Kosovo. A decision in the Security Council proved impossible because of Russia's strategy to outright veto Kosovo's independence.

Several EU-members made apparent their reluctance to back independence outside a UN resolution, because they feared this could set an undesirable precedent in terms of an increasingly pro-active approach toward intra-state conflict, peace-building, and stability operations. However, while the twenty-seven-member bloc dragged its feet on the issue of intervention in a manner that would disengage it from its more traditionally civilian approach to external governance, violence in Kosovo continued and augmented. With the prostration of international negotiations near the end of 1998 and in well into February 1999, NATO was compelled to intervene by launching Operation "Allied Force", which officially commenced on 24 March 1999.<sup>15</sup> The operation, which lasted just over sixty days, was successful in bringing about a brokered settlement between Slobodan Milošević, NATO, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).<sup>16</sup>

Shortly after negotiations between the three authorities ended, the international community shifted its focus from the endorsement of independence for Kosovo towards support for an "internationally supervised status" (EU-representative of the "Kosovo-Troika"). NATO's campaign, which was seen as the first and an essential step in paving the way for stabilization, soon revealed its own intrinsic deficiency as the sole factor in restoring EU- desired order in Kosovo. NATO's intervention, according to Aidan Hehir,

---

15 Aidan Hehir, "Kosovo's Final Status and the Viability of Ongoing International Administration," in *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Sept. 2007), 243

16 Ibid.

was lauded by its supporters as heralding the dawn of a more proactive approach to intra-state conflict.<sup>2</sup> While Operation “Allied Force” sought to address the immediate humanitarian crisis it was not prosecuted with the aim of solving the underlying problem of inter-communal enmity. The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on 10 June 1999 was an acknowledgment of this and indicative of the belief that international engagement was required to complement the suspension of hostilities. UNMIK was established with the aim of providing an internationally run interim-administrative framework that would enable Kosovo to function while its final status was determined.<sup>17</sup>

Prior to armed involvement in Kosovo, expectations towards the outcome of the negotiations between Belgrade and Priština, led by the Troika (EU, US and Russia)—the conclusion of which was required by 10 December 2007—were entirely pessimistic. After the expiry of that date, the leader of the Kosovo transitory government, Agim Çeku, responded by threatening to declare immediate independence. This decision was justified by the view that the overwhelming majority of the population’s desire to be independent legally and morally necessitated such a logical step in peace-building.<sup>18</sup>

In 2007, with the EU having reached its decision to launch a special mission in Kosovo, a grey zone had developed in the nature of European external policy. This mission, it was outlined, would operate within the overall frame-work of the ESDP.<sup>19</sup> To some, this legitimized the mission, and conceivably absolved the EU of acting in contempt of its own civilian and normative values.

In 2006, it was stated that UNMIK would eventually be replaced by EUMIK, and that NATO forces would form the *only* basis of military operations in Kosovo. As the EU nearly ensured its authority over the Kosovo mission, it detailed its key guiding principles in the first report on, “the future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo” in the following terms:

---

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Aidan Hehir, “Kosovo's Final Status and the Viability of Ongoing International Administration,” in *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Sept. 2007), 243 and 244

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 244.

<sup>19</sup> Marko Savković, “What is the Nature of European Union Power in Kosovo?” in *Western Balkans Security Observer*, Vol. 3, (2006), 43.

- (i) Kosovo must not return to the situation before March 1999 and Belgrade and Priština must move towards Euro-Atlantic integration;
- (ii) Kosovo's Status must be based on multi-ethnicity; the protection of minorities; the protection of cultural and religious heritage; and effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism;
- (iii) The solution of Kosovo's Status must strengthen regional security and stability;
- (iv) Accordingly, there must be no change in the current territory of Kosovo (i.e. No partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country after the resolution of Kosovo's status);
- (v) Any solution must be fully compatible with European values and standards and contribute to realizing the European Perspective of Kosovo and of the region;
- (vi) Kosovo will continue to need **international civilian and military presences**.

Details of the EU's contribution to an international presence in the post-UNSCR 1244 phase were also detailed in the report accordingly:

- (vii) Continuation of the EU's role in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process;
- (viii) Further strengthening and streamlining of the EU presence on the ground—Office of the Personal Representative of the HR and the Office of the European Commission in Priština;
- (ix) The future international civilian presence could take the form of an international office with an important EU component but cannot be EUMIK;
- (x) The future military presence should continue to be entrusted to NATO;
- (xi) Core areas will be the protection of minorities and the rule of law (police and justice).<sup>20</sup>

In examining the criteria as established in the summary of notes on EU involvement in Kosovo, it is necessary to pay special attention to three of the aforementioned points in particular. First, the military intervention clause presents a fundamental departure from the EU's traditional role as a civilian power, as defined by Manners. The clause provides a reasonable basis for the argument that the EU bloc's military action, in compromising the normative values of external states that opposed the mission from the beginning, fundamentally diminishes the value placed on civilian and normative processes by the Union itself. In short, a strident extrication in EU logic and values is thus evident.

Second, while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is a clear demonstration of civilian power that lays-out a civilian approach to the study of power in IR, it can therefore be applied to inform an assessment of discrepancies in normative influence as applied to Kosovo. Strategies that are employed elsewhere in the European periphery have resulted in the successful integration of other states into the EU in the recent past. The EU's effort to integrate states into social and economic frameworks is readily observable in the Mediterranean. As George A. Papandeu and Chris Patten show, Europe's ultimate objective in the Mediterranean is the creation of positive influence, and to firmly reach the establishment of trust among all neighbours in that region.<sup>21</sup> It also seeks to establish economic co-operation in order to reach an acceptable level of consolidated peace.<sup>22</sup>

These goals are claimed to be the same instruments through which the European continent was shaped. The problem lies in the assumption that peace, stability, and prosperity have been consolidated in the region directly concerning Kosovo; but many would agree

---

20 "The Council's Approach to the Status Process," and "The EU's Contribution to and International Presence in the post-UNSCR 1244 Phase." *Summary of the report as detailed by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the EU's future role in Kosovo*. June 2005. Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, Brussels. <[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/85228.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/85228.pdf)>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

21 "We Will Not Astonish You,"

<<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=296861&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

22 *Ibid.*

that this has not been the case. Instead, Kosovo's stability may be viewed and understood as little more than a shop window achievement. Communities in the region have never been further apart, while unemployment has never been higher. Enmity between minorities has reached an intolerable high, and violence has become commonplace throughout much of the region. Institutional frameworks in Kosovo are operating at deplorably low levels, which may now be interpreted as Kosovo's norm. Comparisons of the implementation of normative processes and initiatives elsewhere in territories adjacent Europe, as well as within the Union proper, can serve as real and elucidating acid tests of the normative rationale of UNMIK and EUMIK, and the nature of EU power.

The third point that requires special attention centers on the clear language that Kosovo will require an "ongoing military presence" and that NATO forces will form the foundation of the forces to which peace, security, and stabilization are entrusted. Understanding operations as ongoing military presence points to a number of inconsistencies and dilemmas that are not sufficiently addressed by macro-practices of EU institutions. That is, civilian power Europe's prioritization of security concerns and military spending and growth brings us to focus on the contradictions of an increasingly militarized civilian power bloc. Such contradictions are upheld by the EU on a theoretical as well as a declatory level. The EU cannot achieve its own declared objectives within the framework of civilian power, when military institutions and practices represent the real and essential substance of operations, and regional and international enterprise.

Through the opinion that granting independence to Kosovo represented a direct infringement on Security Council Resolution 1244, which recognized Belgrade's sovereignty over Kosovo—and because both Russia and China continuously expressed their desire to see Serbia maintain authority over Kosovo—Serbian President Vojislav Koštunica refused a solution outside of the UN-Security Council and opposed the independence of Kosovo categorically. The resolution detailed the enduring crisis in Kosovo as a distinct threat to the peace and security of South Eastern Europe. As a result of the situation, authorization was extended,

to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the

people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.<sup>23</sup>

For both sides—Serbia and Kosovo—an agreement was seen as *sine qua non* for future membership to the EU, the basis of which raises several critical questions. What possibilities did the EU have to bring about a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict? What are the expectations of the Serbian and Albanian citizens in Kosovo towards the EU? What precedent does the mission now set in territories under the jurisdiction of states that rejected the solution to the Kosovo conflict through independence from the beginning? Will the application of civilian and normative powers continue, or will the official strategy of the EU in its external governance forever change? How then should the official status of civilian power Europe be perceived?

#### **IV. The Nature of EU Power in Kosovo**

##### ***Bringing Together the EU's Four "Pillars"***

In June 1999, following the cessation of conflict, but not necessarily of hostilities and enmity, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1244, which authorized a long and arduous process of peace-building and stabilization hitherto known as UNMIK. The operation involved an unprecedented mandate to promote the establishment, “of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.”<sup>24</sup> UNMIK was also tasked with developing,

---

<sup>23</sup> Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999, paragraph. 10.

<sup>24</sup> Jürgen Friedrich, “UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty,” in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Vol. 9, (2005): 237 and 238.

“provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government.”<sup>25</sup> The following tasks that Resolution 1244 charged UNMIK with are outlined through the following eight points:

- (i) Perform basic civilian administration administrative functions;
- (ii) Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
- (iii) Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status;
- (iv) Co-ordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;
- (v) Support the reconstruction of key infra-structure;
- (vi) Maintain civil law and order;
- (vii) Promote human rights;
- (viii) Assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.<sup>26</sup>

The effective divisions-of-tasks are co-ordinated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). From this position, the four “pillars” of EU operations in Kosovo could be managed, though the processes of each exists under supervision of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG):

Pillar I: Police and Justice (Integrated into the Office of the SRSG as ‘Rule of Law Office’).

---

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> “The United Nations Mission in Kosovo”

<<http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/euinkosovo/uk/about/about.php>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

Pillar II: Civil Administration (Integrated into the Office of the SRSG as the Department of Civil Administration).

Pillar III: Democratization and Institution-Building (Operating under the direction of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE]).

Pillar IV: Economic Development (Operating under the leadership of DSRSG).<sup>27</sup>

The first phase of civil registration was completed throughout Kosovo in mid-July 2000, forming the basis of an electoral roll for municipal elections that were held successfully on 28 October that same year. As this mission represented the first of its kind in the history of the EU, UNMIK was successful in bringing together the four “pillars”. The unique partnership that was formulated by the leading actors and their ancillary components has made it possible for the mission to set in motion the development of Kosovo’s democratic institutions.

As a result of such ground-work, the subsequent development of foundations for medium and long-term social and economic reconstruction could begin. One of the most noteworthy accomplishments during this period of operations may be seen through the social and economic reconstruction that was occurring, even as critically necessary humanitarian assistance and emergency relief continued.

***Changing Traditional Civil and Military Functions: Is the EU Influencing Kosovo, or is Kosovo Influencing the EU?***

The war in Kosovo initiated significant changes in the EU’s CFSP. The Union’s operations revealed its own inadequacies and deficiencies in providing necessary and advanced military capabilities to effectively communicate its geopolitical intentions in the region. As was observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999, EU authorities experienced a

---

27 “The United Nations Mission in Kosovo”

<<http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/euinkosovo/uk/about/about.php>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

moderate case of paralyse. In order to realize an effective and acceptable level of solution, responsibility was given to US authorities in the region. The ESDP, thus, came about in part due to the frustrations of certain EU member states, lead by Great Britain, with the unsuccessful handling of the Kosovo crisis.

Though a contentious history exists regarding EU military operations in the Balkans, in addition to the EU's inability to assume and efficiently lead advanced military operations, the conditions in which the European Union launched its mission in Kosovo represent a considerable shift from previous endeavours. Unfortunately, a persistent blackness on EU military capacity finds its way into the Kosovo mission. This exequity has been defined as the "capabilities gap", in relation to the military potency of the United States. In order to diminish the "capabilities gap" and the perception of waning EU military capacity that it represents, the ESDP was created.

Creating the ESDP was seen as an appropriate response to the gap as a means of communicating to observers why advanced military capabilities should not be seen as the capstone to EU power. Accordingly, the EU has represented military intervention as just one of many forms of involvement in order to brig its political objectives to fruition. In order to create an acceptable security environment in post-conflict societies, the EU aids the formation of institutions that enforce the rule of law. As this approach may be interpreted as a manifestation of the EU's civilian power, the notion of the EU as a true military power may also be interpreted as a diminishment.

The nature of operations as observed in South Eastern Europe over the last ten years, points to the fact that both the EU and NATO are changing in terms of both traditional civil and military functions. Perhaps the most important element change taking-place is that much of the transformation being observed remains undefined. If surmising where many of these changes are coming from proves an exceptionally arduous task, then it is equally difficult to ascertain the direction in which these changes are taking both the EU and NATO. One necessary question to be raised is, whether the EU's civilian and normative power character is being led by NATO's military power identity, or are we seeing the reverse? Thierry Balzacq remarked on the continuing co-operation between the two institutions:

In particular for the EU, its military and political committee, its human rights objectives as part of the common foreign and security policy, and the rapid reaction force were all elements pointing towards an unknown future relationship with NATO.<sup>28</sup>

The particular fashion in which the EU and NATO are continuing their co-operation represents a distinct dynamic of military projection that remains palpable to other actors. This projection is not likely going to be ignored by others either. “Even while the ESDP distinguishes its military operations from the underlying civilian objective,” according to Balzacq, “there has to be symmetry between EU means and its international commitments.”<sup>29</sup>

In spite of the nature of EU engagement in Kosovo, most practitioners should find that the exigency in Kosovo has and continues to warrant a continued co-operative relationship between the EU and NATO. Though such a continued collaboration of power and force would establish a precedent of its own, it could be a step in the right direction given the latest impasse NATO has faced with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s refusal to consider joining the Alliance. Keeping in mind the nature of geopolitical movements in Eastern Europe, and regarding opportunity for NATO expansion with the inclusion of Croatia and Albania into NATO, an ongoing relationship of mutually beneficial military and civilian power-sharing is necessitated most by the these six factors:

- (i) The unresolved nature of ethnic tension in the region;
- (ii) Public opinion, within and external to the EU, that is divided by the question of the eventual outcome of the state-building project in Kosovo;
- (iii) Continual expansion of criminal networks that are interfering with the establishment of an operational socio-economic base in Kosovo;
- (iv) The itinerant nature of many minorities in the region, who regard the security and safety level of the region as exceptionally low and volatile;
- (v) The fragility of the current political structure(s) in Kosovo.

---

<sup>28</sup> Minutes from the meeting: “Civil or Military? The Evolving Nature of EU Power,” from the conference, Challenge and Liberty, Brussels, Belgium: 12 January 2006.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

The policies of the European Union, NATO, and external actors such as the United States, have proven complementary to this point. During much of its operations, which *should* be seen as a political project, the EU remained and continues to remain dependant upon both conventional military means and non-military mechanisms. In short, the EU requires the utility of both civilian and military power to be an effective regional and global actor.

## **V. Beyond ‘Civilian Power Europe’: An Unwelcome Precedent?**

Alongside the policy developments of the past five years has been an explosion of interest and scholarship by writers and journals on the subject of ESDP, CFSP, NATO, European integration, among others. Volumes of work within atypical EU journals, such as *Survival*, *European Security*, *International Affairs*, or *International Peacekeeping*, are now dedicated to the study of the EU as a military security actor. Informed scholarship on the militarization of the European Union is clearly to be welcomed, although concerns for democratic legitimacy and the potential impact on the EU’s civilian power have been largely conspicuous in their absence. I would suggest that works, which analyze reflexively the implications of discussing EU military security without considering the consequences of inserting or writing security into the EU narrative, must be considered part of the securitization problem, rather than a normative solution.

With a case having been made for the EU moving beyond its civilian power role, attention must now shift to the potentially negative consequences for the ‘ethicacy’ and efficacy of its non-military external policies. A number of such consequences surfaced quickly in Kosovo. However, we need not look very far to find comparative models of positive EU influence that is invariably co- operative, indivisible, and comprehensive. The legitimacy of the EU when it engages in military intervention, peace-keeping and peace-building is likely to be increasingly questioned by both Union citizens and those who are the subject of intervention, if they are not accomplished vis-à-vis civilians modes of governance or mechanisms that seek to establish desired ends through normative means.

The perception of the EU as a benign and pacific force in the lives of Europeans and non-Europeans alike is guaranteed to change as militarization and its consequences unfold. Not only do the extremely negative perceptions of NATO action(s) in Kosovo and in previous years in the region provide a classic dilemma in the areas of “Rule of Law,” “Sustainable Development” and “Human Security,” to name a few; the EU is ‘nested’ even deeper in the problem of departing from its traditional sense of purpose via civilian and normative assets.

Notwithstanding negative implications of stepping beyond the realm of normative processes in internal and external relations, the EU has made necessary strides in both the security and defence constellations. Understandably, civilian power is not an instrument that the EU can rely upon in all its neighbourly relations, especially when lacking support from the international community. However, it is a vital step towards a highly competitive, efficient, and normalizing ‘actorness’ in the domain of modern IR, especially when the domain is ever-evolving. Although peace-building and state-building may be seen as contradictory processes rather than complimentary performances, Kosovo serves as a favourable barometer. Kosovo also demonstrates that a complimentary relationship can be achieved between soft and hard power policies in regional and international contexts.

Conflict in which the application of military force was applied has traditionally been accomplished through a continuation of political activities or has been facilitated by the employment of political activities. With the creation and subsequent development of the EU and NATO, European politicians have been able to avoid the trap of falling continuously into the *longue durée* of war and conflict. The result of the amalgamation of both, this type of military and political power represents a solution to the challenges witnessed elsewhere in the world—from Africa to the Middle East to South East Asia. It may also form the basis for a common European-American strategy for addressing some of the world’s most persistent security challenges.

Taking the EU’s recent successes—those over the last twenty years—into account, it is high time to think about the changes in EU external policy that need to be made and accepted as changes that can improve conflict situations quicker and more efficiently in order to begin efficiently addressing post -conflict reconstruction and peace-building. A

focus on a new soft-hard power duality is necessitated by the fact that perceptions on the use of military force successfully and appropriately shift. The use of military force represents an effort and channel through which political goal that does not necessarily translate into positive results for socialization practices or economic consolidation can well be achieved.

Amid ongoing dialogue on the new and evolving nature of European power, and the changing roles of European institutions, questions continue to surface. Does the EU really need a military capability? Is a closer relationship between NATO and the EU foreseen or expected in the future? Can the issues associated with Europe's civilian and normative characteristics, be likened to the UN-reform debate? Although, the disparaging reality is that more questions tend to emerge than do answers, they serve as an exemplification of a greater discourse that is both a response and an impetus for EU power reformation and evolution.

Preventing conflict, stabilizing conflict zones and situations, and deleveraging the capabilities of external and internal threats should be and *can* be seen as efforts innately political in character and nature. Changing the EU's external policy orientation, as well as the ways in which the EU's efforts in external policy are viewed, represents an essential new basis of confidence-building among communities, and the *ab hinc* development of friendly collaboration which is essential not only for the evolving nature of EU power, but for an evolving European Union.

## **VI. Conclusion: A New Concept of EU Power**

The implication, while wide -ranging in IR, as well as in a practical domain, is an inextricably comprehensive concept. Theories of a soft hard power duality have spawned a debate that centers on the idea of tackling such objectives as they relate to political, economic, social, development -related, as well as civilian and classical military issues, within and beyond the EU and far beyond the 'fuzzy' border of Europe.

Utilizing the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the European Union Mission in Kosovo (EUMIK) as means of analyses, this article has presented the argument that the EU has moved beyond its traditional role as a civilian power. In spite of recent strides toward a new orientation of influence and power exertion, the fact that the EU

has not wholly and completely abandoned its civilian character cannot be gainsaid. To the contrary, the EU holds strong to its civilian and normative traditions, while exploring the nexus of military necessity in order to make more efficient the application of its soft power initiatives.

Additionally, this article has also presented some of the negative pitfalls associated with the Union's increasing posture of soft and hard power co-operation, whether such cooperative efforts have in the past or are currently taking place among EU institutions, or whether this includes international arrangements with the United States, for example. Concerns over the 'ethicacy' and efficacy of the Union's policies are now received from internal detractors in volumes equal to those received externally.

Just as EU integration developed under the umbrella of the security guarantee that was ultimately provided by NATO's advanced military capabilities in addition to the United States' unsurpassed military strength, ongoing exploration and analyses is necessary to map the evolving nature of EU power in an ever-changing world of security concerns and challenges. Indeed, a surfeit of factors within the international paradigm, including globalization continue to blur the lines between foreign policy and external security and peace concerns, and this only serves to augment the many concerns and challenges are scholars and practitioners face today.

Increasingly analysts are noticing that opportunity for greater international influence and change has been sitting on the sidelines. This very sentiment has been reverberating in the minds of analysts regarding the 2003 Iraq war, and the coalition operations taking place in Afghanistan. If the European Union should like to realize an even stronger place as an actor in the realm of IR, it might well see the arrangements of civilian-military power Europe as a relationship engrained in the idea of operating *quid pro quo*. Thus, the EU should continue to reinforce its civilian power character with a readily employable military currency.

## **References**

- Adler, Emanuel, and Crawford, Beverly. "Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)." UC Berkeley: Institute of European Studies. <<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6xx6n5p4>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).
- Bildt, Carl. "Force and Diplomacy", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (2000): 141-148.
- Buchan, Alastair. *Change Without War: The Shifting Structures of World Power*. London, UK: Chatto and Windus, 1975.
- Duchêne, Francois. "Europe's Role in World Peace," in R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*. (London, UK: Collins), 32-47.
- Friedrich, Juergen. "UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty," in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Vol. 9, (2005): 225-293.
- Hehir, Aidan. "Kosovo's Final Status and the Viability of Ongoing International Administration," in *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (Sept. 2007): 243-261.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian. "Normative Power Europe: a Realist Critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006): 217-234.
- "European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force," in Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), *Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005: 137-159
- Manners, Ian. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (2002): 235-258.
- "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Cross-Roads", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2006): 182-199.
- "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," in *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 1, (2008): 65-80.
- Minutes from the meeting: "Civil or Military? The Evolving Nature of EU Power," from the conference, Challenge and Liberty, Brussels, Belgium: 12 January 2006.
- Savković, Marko. "What is the Nature of European Union Power in Kosovo?" in *Western Balkans Security Observer*, Vol. 3, (2006): 44-47.
- Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999, paragraph. 10.

**New Balkan Politics**

**Issue 12, 2010**

Smith, Karen E. "Still Civilian Power EU?" European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper, 2005.

----- "The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?" *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April-June 2000), 11-28.

"The Council's Approach to the Status Process," and "The EU's Contribution to and International Presence in the post- UNSCR 1244 Phase." *Summary of the report as detailed by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP, and Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, on the EU's future role in Kosovo.*

June 2005. Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, Brussels.

<[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/85228.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/85228.pdf)>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

"The United Nations Mission in Kosovo"

<<http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/euinkosovo/uk/about/about.php>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).

"We Will Not Astonish You."

<<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=296861&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>>. (accessed 10 June 2010).